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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MINNIE PEARL DALTON, as Administratrix of the Estate of James
F. Dalton, deceased, and MINNIE
PEARL D. A.LTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.
8568

-vsMAX DALTON, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and ap·pellant in her brief refers to the
parties as in the lower court and for uniformity we will
do so also. The statement of the case as set forth in
appellant's brief is substantially correct. We do, however, c.all attention to the fact that by leave of court both
the complaint and answer were amended just prior to
the trial of the issues (Tr. 3). These amendments made
Minnie Pearl Dalton, individually, a party plaintiff and
allowed the defendants to set up Section 78-12-5 .and
6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; and Estoppel as defenses
to the action.
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STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DECEASED, JAMES
F. DALTON AND HIS WIFE, MINNIE PEARL DALTON,
EXECUTED THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 27,
1930 (DEF. E'X. 1) TO DANIEL PERKINS.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
ESCROW AGREEMENT (DEF'S. EX. 2) HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH AND THAT THE WARRANTY DEED DATED
OCTOBER 27, 1930 EXECUTED BY JAMES F. DALTON
AND MINNIE PEARL DALTON, GRANTORS, AND LEFT
IN ESCROW \VITH THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD
BEEN VALIDLY DELIVERED.
POINT III.
THAT 'THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT, :rtiAX DALTON, HAD ACQUIRED TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DECEASED, JAMES
F. DALTON AND HIS WIFE, MINNIE PEARL DALTON,
EXECUTED THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 27,
1930 (DEF. EX. 1) TO DANIEL PERKINS.

The evidence is sufficient to support the court's
finding that both Ja1nes F. Dalton and his \vife, ~finnie
Pearl Dalton signed and executed the \Yarranty deed
dated October 27, 1930, (DEF. Ex. 1).
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3
Mr. I-Ialls, a witness for the defendants
.
' testified
that he had lived in Monticello since 1915 (Tr. 28) and
that he became a.cqu.ainted \vith James F. Dalton soon
after he, (1Ir. Halls) n1oved to l\1onticello and that he
\vas acquainted with Minnie Pearl Dalton and that he
Y{US a notary public on the 28th day of October, 1930
(Tr. 29), and that it was his signature on defendant's
Exhibit 1 ( Tr. 30). He further testified that the deed
\vas signed in his presence as a notary public (Tr. 30)
and that aside from the formality of notarization he
was personally acquainted \vith James F. Dalton's signature and that it was his signature (Tr. 31). As to Minnie
Pearl D.alton's signature he stated that he knew it was
her signature because he had acknowledged it.
Appellant makes much of the point that Mr. Halls
did not remen1ber the circumstances of the signing. We
submit that he was telling the truth. He testified a.s to
his practice as a notary public as follows:

"Q. The Court, don't talk what every other
notary does. You tell what your practice was."
"A. Require them to be the-re and sign. If I
ever took an acknowledgment in absence I don't
remember that time." (Tr. 36).
We further submit that if Mr. Halls h.ad testified
that he remembered the circumstances, after a period
of 26 years had elapsed, his veracity and credibility
might "\Vell have been questioned. It is doubtful that any
notary would remember such circumstances .after such
a lapse of time.
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While it is true that the instrument (Def. Ex. 1)
recited that the Daltons were residents of Cortez, Montezuma County, Colorado, the acknowledgment is in due
fonn for San Juan County, State of Utah. There wa.."
testimony that the D.alton family had lived in Mancos,
Colorado, (Tr. 25, 83) in the spring and fall of 1931.
Mancos is in ~fontezuma County, Colorado.
Appellant refers to defendants' Exhibit 2 which is
a copy of a letter addressed to the State Bank of San
Juan, Monticello, Utah, dated October 27, 1930 and
urges that from the fact that the acknowledgment is
dated Octobe·r 28, 1930, that the signatures were on
the deed before ~t was presented to ~fr. Halls for
acknowledgment. This is rank speculation and has no
foundation in f.act. It should be noted here that the
deed was typed in its entirety except for signatures
and that there is nothing in the record to show ·w·hen
it was actually delivered in escro\Y to the bank. There
is also nothing in the record to indicate \Vhen, where
and by whom said deed was prepared.
We do not agree tltat any point can be made of
the fact that the Appellant, 1\frs. Dalton, did not sign
the escrow agree1nent with the bank. In view of the fact
that the deed bearing both signatures \Vas in fact delivered to the bank, it 'va.s not necess.ary for ~Irs. Dalton
to sign the agree1nent in order to create a valid escro\v.
As to the 'veight to be giYen .to the testilnony of
appPllant, J\{innie Pearl Dalton, on these matters, we call
attention to the transcript of her testimony on cross
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examin.ation beginning on Page 12 when her affidavit
of prejudice (DEF'S Ex. 3.) was presented to her.
While the exhibit is not dated, it was apparently signed
by her on or about the last of November, 1955, and a
copy sent to counsel for defendant on December 5, 1955.
She testified as follows :

"Q. You recognize your signature Mrs. Dalton, is it or is it not your signature~"
"A. I don't think so, I don't think I have
seen it before ... " (Tr. 12).
Even her own counsel became non-plussed by her
obvious attempt to cover up the facts and his effort to
correct her testimony on redirect examination as contained in the transcript on Pages 14 and 15, .and finally
her admission that she signed a paper in Mr. Flanders'
Office, is most revealing. On recross examination, she
finally admitted that the signature on the affidavit
of prejudice was hers (Tr. 27).
Appellant's brief is completely silent on the testimony of Sam F. Parry, a witness for the defendants.
Mr. Parry had been a banker since 1943 during which
time he had become well acquainted with signature comparison. He was a completely disinterested witness and
not acquainted with any of the partie.s to the action.
(Tr. 61 and 62). Defendants' Exhibit 1, the deed, and
defendants' Exhibit 3, the known signature on the affidavit of Prejudice, were presented to him and his testiInony was .as follo,vs :
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"Q. Do you have an op1rnon as to whether
those two signatures were written by the same
person," The Court, "Answer yes or no, as to
whether you have an opinion."
"A. Y e.s, my opinion is that ...
"A. My opinion is that the signatures were
written by the same person."

"Q. The Court: Now, there are two signatures on the one document, which name do you
refer to, Maggie Pe.arl Dalton~"
"A. "The Minnie Pearl Dalton."

"Q. Will you state what you base your
opinion upon, Mr. Parry~"
"A. The fonn of the handwriting is very
similar. There is no evidence of tracing on either
document. The dots above the i's are more in
the fonn of a small line, rather than .a dot. This
irregularity appears on both documents. The form
of the handwriting doe.sn't indicate hesitancy in
the signature, particularly indicates that the person is in the habit of signing in this manner.
The break in the final word "Dalton" shows that
the pen was lifted between the '~t" and the "o"
in both instances. There is a slight left swing at
the end of the word "\Yhich more or less vvould be
an involuntary action in the signature and it
appears in both." (Tr. 64 and 65).
We sub1nit that in vie'Y of the testimony of J.Ir.
Halls both personally and as a notary public.; and the
analysis of the signature of nirs. Dalton by ~lr. Parry;
and in view of the reluctance of ~Irs. D.alton to be forthrjght about her action 'vith respect to her know11 signa-
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ture; and a close analysis of the signatures on all the
documents; leads to the inescapable conclu.sion that both
:ilfr. and Mrs. D.alton, in fact, signed the deed as the
lower court held.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 'THAT THE
ESCROW AGREElVIENT (DEF'S. EX. 2) HAD BEEN COl\1PLIED WITH AND THAT THE WARRANTY DEED DATED
OCTOBER 27, 1930 EXECUTED BY JAMES F. DALTON
AND MINNIE PEARL DALTON, GRA.NTORS, AND LEFT
IN ESCROW WITH THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD
BEEN VALIDLY DELIVERED.

It is the contention of the respondents that there
vvas ample evidence of an escrow contract and agreeInent between James F. Dalton and the bank and Perkins
Brothers, by the terms of which it would have been
paid out in full at the end of seven ye.a.rs or in approximately the year 1934. (DEF 'S :B~x. 2).
In his instructions to the Bank as escrow holder,
nfr. Dalton acknowledged receipt of part of the consideration of the agreement dated June 1, 1927, which was a
part of the entire document. It is to be noted that Perkins
Brothers were to p.ay all taxes as they became due.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit D sho'\\rs that all taxes from the year
1930 to 1941 were paid by the Perkins or their agents
and that the defendant, ~1ax Dalton, paid the taxes
from 1942 to 1955, inclusive.
Unfortunately, those who knew all the f.acts regarding the entire transaction are no longer available.
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Of necessity, we are now forced to draw certain conclusions from the known facts. It must be presumed
that th~ bank, as escrow holder, carried out the instructions contained in the letter of escrow and that upon
completion of the terms therein contained, the papers,
including the deed, were turned over to H. C. Perkins
by the bank, from the fact that they were ultimatelv..,
found in the probate file of the H. C. Perkins estate.
Otherwise, th·ey would have been turned back to James
F. Dalton or his family.
In 30 C.J.S. Para. 18 Page 1222 under Escrows,
we find under the heading of Evidence that:
"Where an instrument deposited as an escro"r
is found in the possession of the party for whom
it was intended, it is presumed to have been
delivered properly." (Citing Clements v. Hood 57
Ala. 459; and Firemen's In.s. Co. v. l\1cMillan. 29
Ala. 147).
We submit that Donald Adams, as attorney for the
Administrator, was not a third party or a stranger to
the transaction in the sense that the tern1 is used in
the c.ases cited by appellant. We call attention to defendants' Exhibit 5 which is the abstract of title on the real
estate involved in this case. The entry beginning on
Page 13 is a decree of settle1nent in the pro hate of the
estate of Hyrum C. Perkins, deceased, dated April 21,
1942, wherein the real estate involved in this case \vas
distributed to his heirs. Plaintiff's Exhibit D is a statement of the tax record for the years 1930 to 1955, inclusive, and shows that the taxes against said real e·state
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were assessed in the name of the H. C. Perkins estate
:from 1943 to 1948 and assessed in the name of the defendant, Max Dalton from 1949 to 1955, inclusive. ~fax
Dalton recorded his deed on November 5, 1948, (DEF'S
Ex. 5, abstract I~ntry No. 15).
The evidence shows that the record title for the
entire period of thirteen years from 1942 to 1955, inclusive, was in the heirs of H. C. Perkins and ~iax
Dalton, and that the taxes were paid for the entire period
by Max Dalton. In addition to paying all the taxes he
was in the exclusive, open and notorious possession of
said premise.s and. used said premises in the usual manner, namely, that of grazing, all during said period4
vVhile it is true that the deed from Minnie Pearl Dalton
.and James F. Dalton dated October 27, 1930 to Daniel
Perkins vv-as not recorded until November 5, 1948, it is
reasonable to asstune that the deed vvas in possession
and control of the heirs of the grantee and had been for
Horne years prior thereto, othervvise, the real estate would
not have been included in the assets of the estate of Hyrunl Perkins. In view of these facts, the actual delivery
of the deed by 1fr. Adams as attorney for the Administrators of the estate to Max Dalton and the recording
of it was routine .and its importance to the case of appellants becomes insignificant.
Vol. 26A of CJS P·ara. 183, Page 14 on Delivery of
Deeds states:
"The delivery of a deed may be presumed
after the lapS'e of many ye.ars, especially where
the parties are dead and the grantee's possession
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of the property has been undisputed." ... "When
the circumstances are such to give rise to a presumption of delivery, the presumption is rebuttable, and the burden of overcoming such presumption rests on the person who denies delivery.''
Vol. 26A of

c·Js

Para. 204, Sec. C, Page 78:

"While the fact that a dee·d duly executed
appears of record is not ordinarily conclusive
proof of its delivery, th·e fact that such recordation is some evidence of its delivery, 'vhich, in
the absence of rebutting evidence, or in connection
with other circun1stances showing an intention to
deliver, rnay be _sufficient to establish a delivery
... Delay ,in recording does not negative delivery;''
(Italics ours)
(G) "The presumption arising from possession of the deed by the grantee ... may be overcome only by the most satisfactory evidence, by
counter evidence of superior weight or by clear
and convincing evidence."
Appellants have not carried this burden of proof.
Notwithstanding the fact that the probate file 'v.as
a public record and the further fact that the taxes were
paid by Perkins and Dalton and that Perkins and D.alton
were in possession of said property, all of 'vhich n1ust
be deemed to have given appellants _notice of their adverse claim, Jatnes F. Dalton and after his death, his
heirs, did nothing 'vhatsoeYer about said property until
many years late-r. They left it from 1926 until 1955 at
which time they returned to take possession of it. (Tr.
7 and 8). The only explanation of rec.ord as to their
re.af;on for non-artivity in asserting title against re-
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spondents, and their predecessors in interest, is the
statement that from 1927 to 1942 the Perkins Brothers
were their agent.s and were to pay the taxes on the
place. (Tr. 24). Letters of Administration in the· estate
of James F. Dalton were not obtained until June 9, 1955,
over ten years after his de.ath. If appellant and her
children seriously believed they had ownership rights in
the property they would not have delayed so long in
asserting them. The record of this case is entirely
silent as to their explanation of inactivity or non-possession for the years 1942 to 1955, inclusive, and which
period of time becomes extremely important as to the
applicability of Sections 78-12-5; 78-12-6; 78-12-7; 7812-8; 78-12-9; 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
POINT III.
THA'T THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT, MAX DALTON, HAD ACQUIRED TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.

The lower court found as follo,vs:

"11. Neither of the plaintiffs nor any agent,
tenant or employee of the plaintiffs has been in
actual possession of the property involved herein
at any time since October 28, 1930." (Finding of
Fact No. 11.)
The court reached the following conclusion:
"That the plaintiffs, Minnie Pearl Dalton,
Administratrix of the Estate of James F. Dalton,
deceased, and Minnie Pearl Dalton in her own
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I

I

)

right ·as surviving wife of James F. Dalton and
. ·?therwise are each barred from claiming said
real esiate or any right therein by reason of the
facts set· forth and by reason of the provisions of
· 'Sections 78,..12-5; 78-12-6; 78-12-7; 78-12-8; 78-12-9;
78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953." (Conclusion of Law No. 2.)

Both this Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law
are supported by the evidence in this C'ase. The record
is devoid of any evidence which would entitle the appellant to prevail in this aetion. Certainly, the burden of
proof was upon her to establish her case and to bring it
within the exception of Section 78-12-5, lTtah Code
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follow.s:
SEIZURE OR POSSESSION WITHIN
SEVEN YEARS NE·C·ESSARY
"No action for the recovery of real property
or for the posse.ssion thereof shall be maintained,
unless it appears that the pl~arntiff, his ancestors,
grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed
of the property in question within seven years
before the commencement of the action."
This she failed to do.
Vol. 26A of CJS, Para. 202, Page 69, correctly states
our position in this case :
"Title to real property resting on warranty
deeds of record, follo\ved by open and notorious
occupation and assertion of title, should not be
easily and reradily disturbed, especially where the
attempt to overthro'v such title is made after the
death of the party most vitally interested therein.''
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Decree as entered in this
case are all amply supported by the evidence and that the
lower court should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

ADAMS, PETERSON & ANDERSON
Attorneys for Respondents
200 Bank Building
Monticello, Utah
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